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Abstract
If collective or social memory is power, then those engaged in the contest for control will seek to manage its
production. One of the most important ways in which public or national memories have been nourished,
shaped and limited in the twentieth century has been through broadcasting and, in the period since the late
1950s, more specifically through television. Television is one of the prime means by which to establish what
Timothy Snyder in his chapter calls 'sovereignty over memory', and to provide both a national framework for
collective memory and to shape individual memories of national events. In this chapter, I want to explore an
important episode in the management of memory as an instrument of conflict prevention or resolution,
namely the role played, in Bosnia-Hercegovina in the late 1990s, by the US-led NATO Stabilization Force
(Sfor) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR). As Ilana R. Bet-EI shows in her chapter, the Bosnian
context was one in which, for generations and centuries, memories were articulated, projected and raised as
flags of combat. Television gave a whole new force to such articulations.
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Ifcollective or social memory is power, then those engaged in the contest
for control will seek to manage its production. One of the most important
ways in which public or national memories have been nourished, shaped
and limited in the twentieth century has been through broadcasting and,
in the period since the late 1950s, more specifically through television.
Television is one ofthe prime means by which to establish what Timothy
Snyder in his chapter calls 'sovereignty over memory', and to provide
both a national framework for collective memory and to shape individual
memories of national events. In this chapter, I want to explore an impor-
tant episode in the management of memory as an instrument of conflict
prevention or resolution, namely the role played, in Bosnia-Hercegovina
in the late 1990s, by the US-led NATO Stabilisation Force (Sfor) and
the Office of the High Representative (OHR). As Ilana R. Bet-EI shows
in her chapter, the Bosnian context was one in which, for generations
and centuries, memories were articulated, projected and raised as flags
of combat. Television gave a whole new force to such articulations.
The narrative of control of information in Bosnia can be linked to
the history of efforts by one state, or a group of states, to influence the
articulation or suppression of particular narratives within the borders of
another state. More than that, it is the precursor of a fairly radical and
important area of potential change, given new media technologies, in the
way in which governments treat the information space of other countries
in times ofcrisis. Already, 'information warfare' is the subject of increased
focus by military strategists. 1 Increasingly, there are examples of media
I want to acknowledge the considerable editorial assistance of Stacy Sullivan who was my
research assistant at the Media Studies Center in New York. An extended treatment of this
subject can be found in Monroe E. Price, 'Information Intervention: Bosnia, the Dayton
Accords and the Seizure of Broadcasting Transmitters', Cornell International Law Journal,
33 (2000), 67.
1 Information warfare has been defined as follows: 'Action taken in support of national
security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary's
information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting
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restructuring in the wake of conflict, part of the general effort (often
an element of peacekeeping) to alter forces tied to historical animosities
reflected in narratives of identity. Information warfare - dealing with the
jamming of enemy military communications technology and command
and control functions - is beyond the scope of this essay. I am interested,
here, rather, in interventions to shape ideas, news, public perceptions of
past and present events, and the relation between an infrastructure of
memory that undergirds a fierce or combative patriotism and one that
turns a people against their government or one another. In this respect,
information warfare includes 'public diplomacy measures, propaganda
and psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception
of or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks
and databases and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements
across computer networks'. 2
Studying the seizure of transmitters in Bosnia in 1997 helps in explor-
ing what role law has in affecting memory in the adjustment of power. In
Bosnia-Hercegovina; the international governmental organisations that
used military authority to structure the space of memory contended
that they were acting pursuant to law. There can, of course, be efforts
to shape memory by the use of force alone without legal justification.
That was not, however, what the Office of the High Representative and
NATO contended as they sought to limit Serbian television's broadcasts-
promulgations ofmemory-prodding rhetoric which had been deemed de-
structive to the peace process. The case ofBosnia, like other similar cases,
demonstrates how those in power, faced with the opportunity or need for
propaganda, use electronic media to play on memories, sometimes to
contrast the painful present with a glorious past, sometimes to create or
reinterpret a past to justify aggressiveness in the present, often to change
perceptions of the present through manipulation of a sense of history.
These events demonstrate problems in the way in which legal systems
authorise or prohibit particular modes of invoking, controlling or invent-
ing memory.
This case study tracks an international peacekeeping effort in which
the tactical significance of power over media and the invocation of mem-
ory was fully recognised. The primary skirmish described in this chapter
concerned not a point of traditional military advantage, but rather con-
trol over a series of regional broadcast towers. In a strategy involving
memory, it is the modes of affecting speech and perception that are the
friendly information systems', United States, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 3430.26 1 (18 January 1995).
2 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming!' Comparative Strategy, 12
(1993),141,144.
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battleground, not bridges or physical terrain. The territory over which
both the international governmental organisations (IGOs) and historic
political forces sought power was not just physical but psychological.
Through control ofbroadcasting media, both the competing forces within
Bosnia and the peacekeeping administration that entered hoped strategi-
cally to invoke and suppress particular memories, and thereby to shape
loyalties and behaviours of the viewing population. Of course, there is
nothing new in this. Collective memory ofdefining events shapes and sus-
tains national identity. Even in times of peace, states maintain - or even
construct - such memories as sources both for shared national identity
and for the legitimacy of state power. Conventional state mechanisms
for emphasising particular histories and strengthening selected memo-
ries include things as relatively innocuous (except when they are points
of turmoil) as designation of national holidays or days of remembrance
and construction of monuments and memorials. Primary education, too,
provides an opportunity to instil in children reverence for bygone national
struggles or heroes, contempt for historic enemies and particular concep-
tions of the role of the state. In the past century, regulation of the media
has emerged as another powerful mechanism for state control over mem-
ory construction and maintenance. Placing broadcasting in government
hands, requiring that programmes reflect a predefined national identity,
or establishing rules for the treatment of subjects such as Holocaust de-
nial - these are all efforts to control who, and under what circumstances,
will have the power to reinforce or alter those memories that affect the
distribution of power within the society.
The narrative of Bosnia also underscores the fact that actors other than
states participate in the formation of collective memory. Within the state,
disempowered populations may articulate counter-histories, emphasising
events elided in dominant versions of national history or offering alterna-
tive constructions offamous events. Disputes over the proper significance
of Columbus's 'discovery' of the Americas reflect rival memories of this
sort, as do Irish folk-songs condemning Oliver Cromwell. Similarly, out-
side actors, including other states or international organisations, may put
forth their own version of events as the authentic one, and so seek to re-
shape memories within national boundaries. For these actors, both legal
and technical challenges arise as they attempt to bring new influences to
foreign information space.
As it happens, a surprising amount of law can be read as affecting
the shaping of memory. Governments have used the power of the state
as they seek to legitimise themselves by reinforcing their version of the
past. Domestic law, even in the relatively pedestrian field of rules of
evidence, may deal with the shaping of memory. The relation of memory
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to law is particularly strong in laws and structures regulating electronic
media. It is in large part because radio and television have such inherent
power to alter perceptions of time, place and history, that their regulation
has been the province of government. Still, there has not been a system-
atic analysis of how international norms are adjusted to allow or forbid
the use of force to shape memory, or how international law is invoked to
regulate memory in which memory is employed in the service of power.
Yet, looking at international covenants and conventions, an underlying
concern with the role of memory in the legitimate and illegitimate uses
of power can be discerned. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, dealing with limitations on freedom of expression, stands as a tacit
recognition of the power of rhetoric, fuelled by memory, to provoke vio-
lence and threaten 'national security, territorial integrity or public safety' .
Even in those instruments aimed at preventing violations ofhuman rights,
such as the Genocide Convention, it can be said that the shaping ofmem-
ory has been a subject of international legal discussion. The Genocide
Convention's concern with destructive attempts against groups based on
ethnic and national identities is reiterated in more positive terms by the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRe). Article 30 of the CRC
expresses a positive right of children of indigenous ethnic minorities to be
raised within that group and to 'enjoy his or her own culture' - in other
words, to share the collective memories and perspectives of the particular
group. 3
While invocations of false memory may be the most obvious point
of concern to international law, this is not the only significant issue.
Indeed, in certain circumstances, invocations of inflammatory and all-
too-real memories can trigger genocidal activities, and promote racism
and war. Certain symbols - a burning cross or flag of the Confeder-
acy in the United States, a swastika in much of the world, pictures of a
mosque in India in the process of destruction, the very voice of a person
designated a terrorist - these alone can be powerful and dangerous trig-
gers of memory. Law sometimes has the function of mediating between
permitted and prohibited expression of such flashpoints of nationalist
emotion.
3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 30. The requirement that children be
raised within their own culture is reiterated in Art. 20 Par. 3, concerning state child
care, and Art. 29 Par. c 1, concerning education. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights' guarantee of freedom of thought, conscience and opinion, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' guarantee of peoples' right to self-
determination can also be seen as considerations of cultural identity, as shaped by shared
memories of historic and current events.
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For more than six months in late 1997 and 1998, Sfor, the NATO
troops playing the peacekeeping role in Bosnia, held key broadcast trans-
mitters under 'security protection' to ensure that information transmitted
to Bosnian Serbs through the media avoided the signals ofconflict deemed
dangerous by the IGOs' so-called Contact Group, the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia and Germany. Sfor also used its
control ofthe media space to promote a more positive image of itself and
of the Dayton Accords. Members of the Contact Group sought to create
an entire new mechanism for the licensing of radio and television stations
throughout Bosnia, establishing standards for their operation and provid-
ing enforcement mechanisms (including fines and closures) against what
the Office of the High Representative deemed transmissions of propa-
ganda undermining the peace process. This active, directed and explicit
intervention in Bosnia, including the seizure of transmitters, has raised
to a new level an international debate, one that began in earnest after
the Rwanda massacres, about the appropriate role of media policy in the
prevention of ethnic conflict and preservation of peacekeeping processes.
Bosnia represents the whole gamut offoreign assistance to remould an in-
digenous media and the narratives it carries. Everything from professional
training to the closing down of stations was employed - all with the goal
of systematically altering representations about the past and the present.
Background on Bosnia and the role
of the media in the conflict
Much has been written about the way in which the media were used
by nationalist leaders to manipulate the collective memory and alter the
framework of power in the former Yugoslavia. Several months before
anyone in the region bore arms, agitators in the various Yugoslav republics
began laying the groundwork for war by planning media campaigns that
would draw from a repertoire of inflammatory memories. As an example,
the then president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, who is widely blamed
for instigating the war in Bosnia, sent paramilitary troops and technicians
to seize a dozen television transmitters in the northern and eastern parts
of Bosnia-Hercegovina in spring 1992. These were the areas closest to
Serbia which also had substantial Serb populations. As a result, more than
half the people in the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina began receiving the
television signal controlled by Belgrade rather than the usual television
from Sarajevo.
With these important transmitters under Milosevic's control, the for-
merly unified Bosnian information space, once centred on a national
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signal emanating from Sarajevo, was fractured. The stage was set for a
fierce war of propaganda and mobilisation of remembered hostilities that
would precede any actual fighting. With the airwaves firmly in Milosevic's
hands both in Serbia and in more than half of Bosnia-Hercegovina, his
television began broadcasting fictitious reports that Serbs in Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina were being massacred by 'Croatian fascists' and
'Islamic fundamentalists'. The propaganda drew on one thread of col-
lective memory, that of past hostility between ethnic groups. Audience
members' perceptions of these reports were inevitably shaped by their
own 'memories' of Croat or Muslim acts in the past - memories in part
historical, in part apocryphal. Of course, neither individual nor collective
memory is necessarily uniform in its ideological significance. Mobilisa-
tion of one powerful memory often requires the suppression of others. In
this case, Milosevic's broadcasts emphasised conflict while obscuring fifty
years ofpeaceful coexistence by Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. Widespread
Serbian embrace ofthis bellicose propaganda was particularly remarkable
given the 30 per cent intermarriage rate in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and per-
haps reflects the emotional power of remembered, older hostilities.
There are varying, though unsatisfactory, interpretations of why the
propaganda was so effective (some commentators point to historic eth-
nic divides arising out of the two world wars, others to the tradition of
media always controlled by the state). False reports drew heavily on col-
lective memories and suspicions. They were laden with Serb symbolism
and historical references to Serb struggles against Ottoman Turks and the
Bosnian Muslims who cooperated with them, as well as against German
Nazis and Croat fascist collaborators. This appealed to many Serbs on an
emotional level; for some, even questioning the truthfulness of the news
reports was seen almost as treason against Serb culture. Some indepen-
dent journalists in Belgrade wrote about the pernicious and dangerous
potential ofMilosevic-controlled television, but their publications did not
have mass readership and could hardly combat the powerful nationalist
television. Whatever the reason, this nationalist and inflammatory propa-
ganda struck fear into the Serb population. So, when Belgrade television
encouraged Serbs to arm themselves against the 'enemies of the Serb
people', many Serbs in both Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia did as they
were told.
The Serbs were not the only ones who understood that a key to power
and influence lay in television and the invocation of memory. Well before
any fighting began in Bosnia, the Croats of Hercog-Bosna, the area in
Bosnia-Hercegovina that is closest to Croatia and has the largest popula-
tion of Croats, seized nearby television transmitters and began receiving
Croatian television broadcasts. Like its Serbian counterpart, Croatian
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television inflamed remembered hostilities with its broadcasts, claiming
that Serbs intended to exterminate the Croat population in order to form
a 'Greater Serbia'. These incendiary programmes suggested to Croats
that they were in mortal danger from the Serbs and that they should arm
themselves before it was too late.
In early 1992 the Bosnian Serb leadership left Sarajevo for the nearby
village of Pale, which would later become their self-styled capital. Almost
immediately, in April 1992, they began broadcasting their own television
channel, Serb Radio and Television (SRT). Firmly under the control of
the nationalist leaders who would lead the war, SRT used the same tactics
as Belgrade television before the war. They recognised the importance of
reinforcing a particular set of memories to maintaining support for those
then in control. Falsified reports of Serbs being slaughtered by Islamist
fundamentalists (Turks) and Croatian fascists (Ustashe) were the norm,
as were false reports about Western conspiracies against the Serb nation.
But no matter how preposterous the broadcasts, they were successful in
stirring up hatred against Muslims and Croats. Ample coverage was also
given to the Serbs who were killed or interned by the Croats allied with the
Nazis during the Second World War, lending credence to reports of new
atrocities by reference to real, remembered ones. Ordinary Serbs came to
believe that the 'Turks' and the 'Ustashe' were waging a war ofaggression
and that the Serbs needed to fight for the survival of their nation. They
became convinced that if they did not begin 'cleansing' Muslims and
Croats from 'their territory', the Muslims and Croats would do it to them.
For the first year of the war, the Muslims and Croats were allied against
the Serbs. But once the Serbs were pushed back from Croat territory in
1993, the Croats turned against their former Muslim allies and began
fighting them. Again, television played a key role. The Croats, like the
Serbs, wanted to carve out a piece of Bosnia-Hercegovina for themselves
to create a 'Greater Croatia'. Again playing on memories of past hostil-
ities, Croatian television from Zagreb began broadcasting reports about
Islamist fundamentalists trying to create a state in which Roman Catholic
Croats would be oppressed and subjugated. Muslims were portrayed as
dirty and anti-Christian, intent on depriving the Catholics of their re-
ligion and heritage. The strategy was effective, encouraging a sufficient
number of Croats to fight against their Muslim neighbours and increase
the carnage.
The Dayton Accords and the media
The war in Bosnia was a brutal combination of psychological manip-
ulation and physical violence, which ended with the 1996 US-brokered
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Dayton Peace Accords. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman
were summoned to Dayton, Ohio, where diplomats worked through the
nights to hammer out a compromise and redraw the boundary lines on
the map. It was finally agreed that Bosnia-Hercegovina would remain one
country, but divided into two entities: Republika Srpska, and the Muslim-
Croat Federation. That structure satisfied the Serbs because they were,
in a sense, given their republic, even though it was an 'entity', not a state.
The agreement satisfied the Muslims because it, in a sense, kept Bosnia-
Hercegovina whole. It offered less to the Croats, except that, as part of
the Muslim-Croat Federation, they were able to form special ties with
neighbouring Croatia. A critical question was who would control the in-
formation space, who would determine which memories were repeated
and reinforced, what narratives of the future would be created. How his-
tory was presented, including the very recent history, would affect the
possibility of elections, the potential for resettlement of refugees and the
success, if that word were possible, of the Dayton Accords themselves.
The civilian aspects of Dayton were not so well thought out as its mili-
tary provisions and led to divided and complex sources of authority. The
accords stipulated that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) would organise elections, that the United Nations would
create an unarmed civilian police force to supervise the entities' police
forces and that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
would oversee the return or resettlement ofdisplaced peoples or refugees.
A High Representative chosen by the Contact Group would coordinate
the activities of the different organisations. Together, these organisations
aimed, in a sense, to reconstitute Bosnia-Hercegovina's former multi-
ethnic nature and create a Bosnian national identity against a backdrop
of continuing ethnic hatred and loyalties. Each element - elections, do-
mestic security and the return of refugees - implied a kind of reconstruc-
tion of consciousness that implicates the reformulation of memory. Each
element, if it were to be perceived as organic and evolved, and not as an
artificial creation of an alien occupation, had to find part of its justifica-
tion in a practice or ethos of the past. The elections, which were designed
to reverse ethnic cleansing, would be the IGOs' most crucial task, and
also the most rigorous test of Dayton's success in altering the relationship
of past to future.
The accords were signed in Paris in January 1996 and were immedi-
ately put into force. It was not possible, as part of the initial accords, to
dislodge the recently conflicting entities from control of the media; Serb
and Croat leaders clung to their party-controlled television and radio
outlets to maintain and extend existing power. The Serb-held parts of
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Bosnia-Hercegovina were still strictly under the influence of the rabidly
nationalist Serb Radio and Television (SRT), and the Croat-held parts of
Bosnia-Hercegovina under the equally nationalist influence of Croatian
Radio and Television. The Bosniak-controlled part of the country re-
ceived broadcasts from Bosnia-Hercegovina Radio and Television, which
had become increasingly nationalistic over time, although committed to
the cause of integration and the success of the Dayton experiment.
All three groups vied for use and control ofthe airwaves both within and
beyond their geographic spheres of influence. Croats, Serbs and Muslims
set about repairing war-damaged television transmitters on mountains
within their respective territories, seeking the means to broadcast as far
and wide as possible. Belgrade set up a television transmitter in Serbia,
near the border with the newly created entity of Republika Srpska, to
broadcast Serbian television throughout Serb-controlled territory, and
also aided the Bosnian Serbs in repairing transmitters damaged by NATO
bombing. Zagreb put up additional transmitters in Croatia, near the bor-
der with Bosnia, to broadcast Croatian television into Bosnian territory,
and aided the Bosnian Croats in repairing existing transmitters, as well
as adding additional transmitters to increase the coverage of Bosnian
Croat television. The Bosnian government received outside assistance
from the Norwegian government to renovate and repair some twenty-one
television transmitters to enhance the multi-ethnic voice that would have
the capacity to facilitate reconciliation. Each entity used broadcasting
power to continue sending its own messages, reinforcing its own preferred
threads ofcollective memory, and influencing viewers' sense ofethnic and
national identity.
Implementation of the accords
Just days after the Dayton agreement was signed in Paris, Robert Frowick,
the American who headed the OSCE mission in Bosnia, arrived in Sara-
jevo to begin planning for the elections. Frowick and the other European
and American diplomats who were implementing the Dayton Accords
were keenly aware of the role the media played in the war, and the role it
would continue to play in peace. The diplomats feared that as long as rival
broadcasters saturated the airwaves with invocations ofdivisive memories
and tropes of conflict, the unified country envisioned by Dayton could
not be realised. If alternative sources of information were not provided
across the country, the same nationalist leaders who waged the war and
controlled the airwaves were sure to be voted back into power. The inter-
national community recognised that it needed to playa role in adjusting
media practices.
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The refashioning ofmemory became part of the context ofadministra-
tive vocabulary as it was translated into the field ofbureaucratic operation.
The template for election reform demanded objectivity and impartiality
(as defined by the IGOs) - and failure to sustain this perspective in repre-
sentations ofpast and present issues rendered political parties and broad-
casters vulnerable to official complaint. The OSCE established a Media
Experts Commission (MEC) within the Provisional Electoral Commis-
sion. It issued a set of rules and regulations, charging the media with
duties including 'providing true and accurate information', 'refraining
from broadcasting incendiary programming', and running OSCE and
international election-related statements and advertisements. It also set
up a monitoring group which could cite violations of these rules. Truth
and accuracy could have reference to the past as well as to the present.
In addition to rules designed to restrain the existing media, the OSCE
pioneered another technique of intervention, helping to finance a spe-
cial broadcast network that would positively influence the mix of nar-
ratives and images transmitted to the public. The Free Elections Radio
Network (FERN), was initially started by the Swiss government to pro-
vide 'objective and timely information on the elections' to the people of
Bosnia-Hercegovina in all entities. This project provided a less incendi-
ary news source, avoiding the national broadcasters' constant emphasis
on recent hostilities and tragedies - content which the OSCE found in-
consistent with the reconciliation and democratic process envisioned by
Dayton.
The seizure of transmitters
The existence of a highly nationalistic ethnically homogenous and in-
tensely focused political party, coupled with a virtual monopoly of the
media, posed a threat to the Office of the High Representative and the
operation of the Dayton bureaucracy as it went about its rebuilding ef-
forts. Regulation of the electoral process by the OSCE was not enough
to reduce the harsh bias by which divisive memories were nourished.
And, in spite of all the efforts to create alternative sources of informa-
tion across Bosnia-Hercegovina, in spring 1997 the media remained di-
vided into three mutually antagonistic components in Republika Srpska,
Bosniak-controlled Federation territory and Croat-controlled Federation
territory. The party-controlled television stations remained the most in-
fluential media outlets and the main source of news for all of Bosnia-
Hercegovina's ethnic groups. Other, internationally sponsored, efforts
to break a tradition of dependence on official programming was not
sufficiently successful. Clearly, the attempts by the IGOs to create an
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alternative to the party-controlled media had not been sufficient to com-
bat the nationalist television stations, which continued to stir up hostility,
not only towards each other, but also towards the IGOs themselves. Much
of Sfor's and the other international organisations' work towards recon-
ciliation was perceived by Sfor and the OHR as being jeopardised by the
news and propaganda of nationalist television and radio.
Over the summer of 1997, conflict over the content and control of
broadcast media intensified. The Steering Board of the Peace Imple-
mentation Council of the Contact Group, distressed by the continuing
divisiveness of party-controlled media, issued the Sintra Declaration, a
document considered by OHR to be an extension of the Dayton Accords,
although neither Bosnian signatories of Dayton nor current elected
Bosnian officials signed the Declaration. This instrument dramatically
asserted OHR's right both to demand airtime for its own broadcasts and
to suspend broadcasts which contravened the letter or spirit of Dayton.
The Sintra Declaration was later to be cited in justification of Sfor's
seizure of broadcasting towers.
Within Republika Srpska struggles for media control intensified as
US-backed Biljana Plavsic announced that the SRT station in her power
base of Banja Luka would cut ties with the central SRT Pale station,
broadcasting from the seat ofher rival Radovan Karadzic. The Pale broad-
cast had drawn heavily on viewers' memories and associations of conflict,
openly comparing Sfor to the occupying Nazi forces of a generation be-
fore. The broadcast played on recollections of previous atrocities, and
featured alternating images of Sfor soldiers and Nazi storm troopers.
On 22 August US troops acted on the Sintra Declaration and, claiming
that they moved to prevent possible clashes between Plavsic and Karadzic,
seized the SRT broadcast tower in the north-eastern town of Udrigovo.
This move cut off SRT Pale broadcasts to the region, temporarily sus-
pending the flood of inflammatory invocations. Ten days later, American
soldiers guarding the tower were attacked by a mob of 300 Serbs, pre-
sumed to be supporters of Karadzic. Pale radio broadcast that Sfor had
'occupied' the SRT transmitter and claimed that Sfor was a 'heavily
armed military force threatening courageous unarmed citizens'. 4
The resulting negotiation between the Sfor and the Pale authorities pro-
duced a document that became known as the Udrigovo Agreement. Sfor
handed back the tower to the SRT authorities in Pale, and in return the
Pale authorities agreed to certain conditions for resumed broadcasting.
Pursuant to the Agreement, the media of the Serb Republic would stop
producing inflammatory reports against Sfor and the other international
4 Bosnian Serb Radio, Pale, in Serbo-Croat, 1 Sept. 1997.
148 Monroe E. Price
organisations implementing the Dayton Accords; SRT would regularly
provide an hour of prime-time programming to air political views other
than those of the ruling party; and SRT would provide the Office of High
Representative with half an hour of prime-time programming daily. 5
The Agreement required SRT to transmit alternate representations of
both current events and the history that had led up to them. In the wake
of the Udrigovo Agreement and the formation of the international Media
Support Advisory Group (MSAG), the Serb leadership appeared to take
a more conciliatory tone towards the Western diplomats implementing
Dayton. But that cooperation was short-lived. On 8 September the OHR
and Sfor sent a letter to SRT in Pale, demanding ninety minutes of air-
time to broadcast an OHR programme that same evening and an hour of
airtime the following day, among other time demands. SRT Pale refused
to broadcast the material, and instead, further angering international of-
ficials, charged OHR and Sfor with violating 'freedom and human rights'.
The SRT Pale newscaster read a statement from the SRT Pale editorial
board stating: 'We publicly announce that under no conditions would we
implement these requests. By doing this, we would trample on our moral
integrity and our profession. In our radio and TV broadcast, we shall
continue to ridicule orders like the one saying that video material must
be broadcast in its entirety and with no changes ... 6 Against this back-
ground of increased conflict on the airwaves of Republika Srpska, and
raised stakes for political control of the entity as the election drew nearer,
US government opinion increasingly favoured jamming SRT Pale's broad-
casts. In fact, the United States dispatched three air force EC-130
Commando Solo aircraft capable both of broadcasting information and
jamming existing radio and television signals. US officials claimed that the
primary role of the electronic warfare aircraft would be to 'broadcast fair
and balanced news and information to the local population';7 but Voice
ofAmerica (VOA) broadcasts to Bosnia-Hercegovina also stated that the
aircraft had the capability to jam pro-Karadzic transmissions. VOA also
5 The Media Support Advisory Group (MSAG) consists ofthe OHR, Sfor, the OSCE and
the UN, the four principal organisations responsible for the implementation of Dayton.
Established in late September 1997, its function was essentially to monitor and govern
the media in Bosnia-Hercegovina to the extent that it could according to the Sintra
Declaration and the OSCE's Media Experts Commission (MEC). The MSAG declared
itself 'the body that provided the executive mechanism to demand the level and type of
access required in an outlet deemed in violation of the ... MEC'. If such demands were
not complied with, the MSAG would then recommend escalation 'as necessary' using
the par. 70 powers of the Sintra Declaration giving the High Representative authority to
'curtail or suspend' any media network or programme whose output is in violation ofthe
Dayton Accords.
6 Radio B92, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat, 8 September 1997.
7 Voice of America, Washington, English, 13 Sept. 1997.
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reported the US beliefthat Karadzic supporters had violated the U drigovo
Agreement's mandate that they soften their rhetoric against Plavsic and
NATO peacekeeping troops, and broadcast a US Defense Department
spokesman's claim of Sfor's legal authority to block broadcasts.
As the local elections loomed nearer, with the battle for the Republika
Srpska's airwaves becoming increasingly bitter, Western diplomats feared
that the media conflict could lead to more violence. Milosevic (the real
power broker among the Serbs) was urged to summon Plavsic and ri-
val leader and broadcaster Momcilo Krajisnik to the bargaining table in
Belgrade, where the internationally brokered Belgrade Agreement was
hammered out. This document established a 'fairness doctrine' for SRT
Banja Luka and SRT Pale, in which the two leaders agreed that the uni-
fied media environment of the Republika Srpska and free access to media
by all participants in elections was 'vital' for a democratic process. They
agreed that news programmes be broadcast daily from studios in Pale
and Banja Luka alternately.8
Hope for a harmonious implementation of the Agreement were im-
mediately dashed. Only a day after it was signed, the MSAG 'expressed
concern about the editorial policies'9 of SRT Pale. A news release from
the OHR said that SRT Pale was continuing to broadcast political an-
nouncements as news, 'devoid of any balance or alternative opinion'. 10
The news release might have been taken as a warning by SRT Pale. But,
characteristically, SRT Pale refused to soften its editorial content, and
continued to structure its representations of both Sfor and domestic ri-
vals to invoke memories of conflict, and sustain ongoing hostilities.
On the following day, 26 September, the chief prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Louise Arbour,
gave a press conference in Sarajevo, which was covered by SRT. In a
commentary, the SRT Pale announcer reiterated the Bosnian Serb lead-
ers' long-held position that the tribunal was a political instrument and
that it was prejudiced against the Serbs. The United Nations, which is
a member of the MSAG, considered this a breach of prior understand-
ings, including the Udrigovo Agreement, and demanded that SRT Pale
make a public apology on television. On 30 September SRT Pale did
so, and broadcast unedited footage of the news conference. 11 In spite of
SRT Pale's apology, Sfor troops seized control of four SRT transmitters
the next day (1 October), thereby preventing SRT Pale from transmit-
ting its broadcasts. In addition to asserting that SRT Pale's blunder was
a violation of the Sintra Declaration, Western governments also claimed
8 Belgrade Agreement, point 3, Belgrade, 24 Sept. 1997.
9 Beta News Agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat, 25 Sept. 1997.
11 Beta News Agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat, 30 Sept. 1997.
10 Ibid.
150 Monroe E. Price
that the station's repeated broadcast comparing Sfor troops to Nazis con-
stituted a threat to the safety of the Sfor troops and, therefore, needed
to be silenced. SRT Pale's appeal to memories of oppressive occupation,
these governments recognised, could have very real consequences in the
responses of viewers.
Sensitive to the potential for condemnation of the seizure, Sfor and
OHR announced that SRT Pale could regain access to the transmission
network and resume operations, but only if strict conditions were met.
SRT Pale would be obliged to agree to 'criteria for its reconstruction and
reorganisation, as well as for editorial control of broadcasting, as sug-
gested by the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Hercegovina
and the international community' .12 On 6 October, several days after
NATO seized the transmitters, the major international power broker, US
special envoy for the Balkans Robert Gelbard appeared in the region. In
a statement two days later, the High Representative said that a 'transitory
international director-general' and two deputies would be appointed by
the OHR to head SRT Pale, that the OHR would draft a statute and edi-
torial charter for the station, that SRT Pale would be obliged to broadcast
programmes requested by officials from other international organisations
without editing or commentary, and that a team of journalists and editors
would be brought in to train personnel and supervise the programming of
SRT Pale. He added further that the SRT journalists and editors would be
evaluated by the international representatives and that 'only those who
are positively evaluated will be able to get a job again,.13 This was an
extraordinary assertion of power by the High Representative and it infu-
riated the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale, possibly drawing on a history
of associations with official interventions in the Soviet period.
At the Peace Implementation Council's meeting in Bonn in December
1997, the Contact Group members agreed to reinforce efforts to 'break
the political control of the media', and restructure the media landscape
'according to internationally recognised standards' .14 The OHR said
that the idea was to create an interim media regulation board to intervene
in editorial content, restructure the media and regulate its content. The
board would provide training to journalists, but it would also have the
power to shut down media and to pick and vet journalists - in other
words decide who could and could not work as a journalist. OHR would
establish two commissions, one to 'ensure that media standards are re-
spected and would issue licenses. The other would be of an appellate
nature and would deal with complaints on media treatment or media
12 Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, in Serbo-Croat, 3 Oct. 1997.
13 Beta news agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat, 9 Oct. 1997.
14 OHR Media Strategy paper, Background, point 2, April 1997.
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behaviour in the communications process.'15 In a neat reversal of SRT
Pale's Nazi comparisons, the officials noted that the foundation for the
new media strategy in Bosnia-Hercegovina was based on the Allies' post-
war experience in Germany. Here, the power of Second World War
memories was mobilised against the broadcasters, rather than against
the Western powers.
Information intervention, memory and the marketplace
for loyalties
Bosnia-Hercegovina is an institutionally and legally complex case study
of the phenomenon newly christened as 'information intervention'. In
the world of ethnic and regional conflict, whether it involves Zapatistas
in Mexico, Kurds in Turkey, separatists in Angola or Tamils in Sri Lanka,
terrestrial transmitters and signals direct from satellites can serve to shape
public perception of current events, often drawing on collective memory
of previous conflict or injustice. These resurgent memories can be fuel
for campaigns ofviolence by or against the state and among communities
with different views of the public order - often shaped by their different
versions of past events. Not only the United States as superpower, but
the international community as a whole, increasingly sees potential for
countervailing use of the media as a therapeutic tool, including the af-
firmative use of a more pluralistic media to reduce or prevent conflict or
increase the possibility of democracy.
Because of the importance of this phenomenon of information inter-
vention, it is crucial to understand the basis on which the international
community can intervene in a way which, on one level, seems to violate
free speech principles, and which had such a comprehensive effect on
media and information space in Bosnia-Hercegovina. If the international
parties intervening were not acting pursuant to legal authority themselves,
their moral claim that those in conflict follow the rule of law loses some
of its credibility. NATO, the OSCE and the OHR acted as law-makers
and enforcers: they required that their statements be broadcast; they
established standards for existing stations; they closed stations down;
they put into operation a mechanism wholly to revise the licensing and
administration of radio and television. What occurred was one of the
most comprehensive possible catalogues of the exercise of authority. Var-
ious groups within Bosnia-Hercegovina questioned whether the United
Nations or NATO or others had valid power to engage in these activi-
ties, and outside groups, including the World Press Freedom Committee,
15 Dveni Avaz, Sarajevo, in Serbo-Croat, 30 Oct. 1997.
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expressed grave reservations as to whether these steps were consistent
with international norms.
The law ofmedia intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina is nowhere clearly
stated, and it is not necessarily true that the United States and other par-
ties sought a legal justification at each step as opposed to responding
to practical realities. But the source of law matters. For example, if the
United States and its Western allies were acting as occupiers, then their
powers and the limits on them would be governed by a particular body
of international norms. 16 If they were acting, on the other hand, under
a consent regime, then the shape of their authority would be governed,
in large part, by the conditions of their entry. One could ask whether
the peacekeeping forces were functioning as occupiers, although under
current norms (norms that, themselves, are subject to debate), occu-
pation - and certainly 'belligerent occupation' - does not best describe
the status of the international presence in Bosnia. This is important be-
cause occupiers have the capacity to act in lieu of a sovereign, although
those actions are constrained by the duty to serve as a surrogate for the
local sovereign and to do so in accord with internationally established
standards.
16 Another source of law - either authorising the actions of NATO and the OHR or es-
tablishing limits to those actions - involves what might be called the law of occupation.
There has been a debate about the use ofthe term 'occupation' in describing the activities
of the international community in Bosnia and a debate, as well, over the use of the power
of the occupier to justify media and information intervention there. After the Second
World War, the United States and its allies made it a major objective to refashion totally
the radio broadcasting systems in Germany and Japan. One of the important elements of
the occupation was to construct or reconstruct a democratic society. To do that required
a transition and an imposed architecture that would have transformative capabilities. A
focus on changes in radio seemed especially appropriate given the key role ofpropaganda
in fuelling the war, both at home and abroad.
In Germany, the future structure of broadcasting was changed for ever by the Allies,
who forced a splitting up and decentralisation so as to prevent a dominant national voice.
In Japan, the US government sought to eradicate all elements of militarism and nation-
alism, as it was there understood. The first Memorandum of the Allies, in somewhat
Orwellian phrases that are invited by this kind of situation, claimed to be reestablishing
freedom of speech and of the press, but at the same time required that news be true
to facts, be faithful to the policies of the Allied Powers and refrain from sceptical crit-
icisms of the Allied forces. None of this history, of course, necessarily serves to justify
the actions of the OHR or Sfor. Bosnia-Hercegovina is not Japan or Germany, and the
accoutrements of occupation are not exactly present there.
In Japan and Germany, the Allies were 'belligerent occupiers', and a framework of
international law has developed to articulate standards for such an occupation. Less
well developed is what might be called a 'non-belligerent occupation', one that is more
characteristic of the Bosnian context. (The question of whether there is such a status as
non-belligerent occupier and what powers such an occupier has comes down to consent.
And in that sense, the issue ofthe powers and limitations of this non-belligerent occupier
are governed by the Dayton Accords, since is that is the foundational consent of that
agreement.)
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Perhaps at the heart of the Dayton Accords was some understanding,
at least by the parties, that memory and its exploitation was as impor-
tant an element of peacekeeping as more traditional military and quasi-
military undertakings. The maintenance of an intensely partisan, politi-
cally controlled, monopoly media, strongly contesting the integrity, goals
and competing narrative of Sfor and the IGOs simply could not long
be tolerated. If a plural, multi-party Bosnia-Hercegovina was to emerge
from Dayton, then, at least in the eyes of the OHR, a morphological
unity between political party, ethnic group and dominant channel had to
be broken. The media structure symbolised a Bosnia-Hercegovina that
was seen as antithetical to a multi-ethnic future polity. Breaking the hold
of the Bosnian Serbs' nationalist party on the media and the electorate
was part of the basis of seizing the transmitters that serviced SRT Pale.
In establishing the machinery for elections, the parties agreed to have put
in place a set of election principles and a mechanism for deciding when
those principles were violated.
Conclusion
'Information intervention' describes efforts by those in power - an inter-
national force or local authority - to use media to shape collective memory
of the past so as to influence present and future activity. Media regulation
and exploitation is commonly used by the controlling group or groups
to reinforce its ideal notion of identity and history. As in a market for
goods, competitors in the 'market for loyalties' seek to use force or the
force of law to seize and maintain power over media. A narrow funnel
for expression, created by controlling which viewpoints have access to
the means of mass communication, is often used either to function as an
integrating, assimilating influence, subtly reinforcing a vision ofcohesion,
or to support and exacerbate existing cultural divisions in society.
Law has been used to protect domestic producers of national identity
from international competition. For most of the twentieth century, the
international order believed that radio transmissions should be contained
primarily within the boundaries of one nation; the international function
was to dispense frequencies so as to ensure that conditions of market
division along national borders could be realised and enforced. Interna-
tional regulations and arrangements were built to implement the policy
of limiting broadcasting, in large part so that these internal monopolies
over memory could be preserved. For example, an early document of the
League of Nations provided that 'The High Contracting Parties mutu-
ally undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay
the broadcasting within their respective territories of any transmission
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which to the detriment of good international understanding is of such a
character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible
with the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting
Party.' And in the debate in the 1970s over the use of direct broadcast-
ing satellites, a draft agreement provided that state parties 'undertake to
exclude from television programmes transmitted by means of artificial
earth satellites any material publicising ideas of war, militarism, Nazism,
national and racial hatred and enmity between peoples as well as ma-
terial which is immoral or instigative in nature or is otherwise aimed at
interfering in the domestic affairs or foreign policy of other States.'
In Bosnia-Hercegovina NATO and Sfor, managing what I have called
a market for loyalties, used media law to establish the parameters of what
memories could and could not be articulated. A market for loyalties im-
plies one in which entry is highly regulated, essentially to reinforce the
mix of accounts of the past and present that maintains the existing power
structure. In fact, the function of government in a market for loyalties
ordinarily goes far beyond its role as regulator and enforcer for a cartel
of identity producers. The government is frequently a participant in the
market for loyalties in its own right, also trying to insert and promulgate
its own version of historical narrative. The relationship between the state
as censor and the state as generator of images is important. Not only
have governments historically sought to exclude a range of destabilising
narratives, but they have also ensured that a reinforcing sense of national
identity is available and, if possible, prevails. The actions of Sfor and the
OHR are in this tradition of state control of memories. The nature of the
peace process and the qualities of those elected offices would be a direct
function of the images of the past that received the extraordinary imprint
of television. For that reason, intervention became the desired option. If
there is a market for loyalties, the Bosnian example illustrates how exter-
nal powers' forcible control of information space alters the functioning
of the cartel and redefines the relationship of memory to power.
